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abstract: Gasking’s parody of Anselm’s ontological argument is primarily based on 
the idea that the greater disability of the creator makes the achievement more im-
pressive, and that, therefore, the non-existent God would be a greater creator of the 
universe than the existent God would be . On the contrary, I argue that either the 
non-existent God cannot create anything existent, or, if we introduce Meinongian 
metaphysics in order to save the parody, that non-existence would cease to be the 
most formidable handicap within the domain of fictional characters, or that encoded 
achievements need not be more impressive than exemplified achievements . These 
insights suggest that Gasking’s parody does not work .
key words: Ability, achievement, Gasking’s parody, Meinongianism, the ontological 
argument .
Douglas Gasking’s parody, reconstructed by William Grey (2000), is a witty 
and seductive way of challenging Anselm’s ontological argument (Anselm 
1973) . My aim is to show in this paper that the parody, however ingenious, 
does not work due to the ambiguities in key notions used in the argument . 
After presenting Gasking’s parody together with Grey’s example intended to 
provide an intuitive support to its key premise, I offer some reasons why 
Gasking has not proved what he claims he did . Grey’s reconstruction of 
Gasking’s parody goes as follows (Grey 2000: 369):
1) The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement im-
aginable .
2) The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, 
and (b) the ability of its creator .
3) The greater the disability (or a handicap) of the creator, the more 
impressive the achievement .
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4) The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence .
5) Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent 
creator, we can conceive a greater being – namely, one who created 
everything while not existing .
6) An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greater 
cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible 
creator would be a God which did not exist .
ergo,
7) God does not exist .
Gasking exploits the same principle that is used in the ontological ar-
gument, according to which existence is a perfection and non-existence is 
a handicap . By means of such a principle, the conclusion opposite to the 
conclusion of the ontological argument is inferred . This, of course, does not 
mean that Gasking’s parody was intended to be an argument against the exist-
ence of God . It is rather an attempt of neutralizing the ontological argument 
either by showing that at least one of its general principles leads to contradic-
tion or by shifting the burden of proof on those who try to keep the general 
principles and to attack other premises on which the parody is based .1
Some think, like Richard Dawkins (2006: 83–84), that Gasking suc-
ceeded in parodying the ontological argument,2 while philosophers like Gra-
ham Oppy and William Lane Craig dismiss Gasking’s argument very briefly . 
Since I do not hold Oppy’s an Craig’s critiques plausible,3 I will present my 
own critique of Gasking’s parody in due course .
1. Achieving So Much with So Little
Probably the most intriguing premise of Gasking’s parody is premise (3) .4 
Grey is well aware of that, and soon after voicing Gasking’s argument, he 
1 In that respect, parodies are usually counted as arguments (see, for example, Oppy 
2016 for more details) .
2 William Grey, who has reconstructed Gasking’s argument, did not say anything against 
it . Actually, he has provided an intuitive support to this argument (see the next section), and 
pointed out some advantages of Gasking’s parody with respect to our understanding of creat-
ing the world by God (Grey 2000: footnote 5) . 
3 Reasons for this are given in footnote 4 and §2 .
4 In his entry on ontological arguments, Graham Oppy (2016) challenges premise (1), 
claiming that one can imagine God creating two worlds instead of one . This objection might 
be handled if, for example, one endorses the combinatorial theory of possibility, according to 
which possibilities are understood as combinations of one and the same number of elements . 
In that case, it would not be possible to create two worlds instead of one . Further, even if this 
strategy is not accepted for some reason (for instance, if the combinatorial theory implies that 
it is inconceivable that God creates two worlds instead of one), Gasking’s parody could be 
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offers an example in order to make premise (3) plausible (Grey 2000: 369) . 
In his example, we are looking at an elaborate model of the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge, constructed entirely from toothpicks and glue, being amazed by the 
ingenuity and patience of its creator . Suddenly, we become even more amazed 
after realizing that the model was built by a quadriplegic who used only his 
teeth during the work . Such an enterprise looks more marvellous than the 
one in which, let us say, the same object was built by someone who does 
not suffer from quadriplegia . The moral of Gasking’s parody is, according to 
Grey, that perfectness consists in “achieving so much with so little (indeed 
with nothing at all)” (Grey 2000: 369) .
At first glance, it is a bit surprising that Grey emphasizes the “ingenuity 
and patience” of the creator of the model of the Sydney Harbour Bridge in 
order to illustrate the plausibility of Gasking’s idea that the greater the disa-
bility of the creator the more impressive her achievement . After all, ingenuity 
and patience are usually considered to be highly appreciated abilities, of which 
the latter is probably nurtured, while the former is very often understood as 
a gift of Mother Nature .
Yet, under closer scrutiny, Grey’s appeal to abilities like the ingenuity 
and patience of the creator does make sense, since some highly appreciated 
abilities are arguably required in order for something to be called “achieve-
ment” . This is quite in accordance with how we understand this term in 
everyday life: We usually do not count as achievements the products of mere 
luck, but rather something which is the product of a voluntary and controlled 
activity . For example, in many cases in which the agent lacks the skill to reli-
ably perform the behaviour, people are more inclined to give the agent very 
little praise if her success is due almost entirely to luck: A novice who does 
not have any skill in shooting would not have been praised had he hit the 
bull’s-eye successfully, at least not when compared to a skilful shooter who 
manifested the same behaviour .5 In a sense, the disability of a creator some-
times decreases the merit of the achievement, or even precludes it, contrary 
to what premise (3) of Gasking’s parody states .
reformulated so that its first premise states that under the supposition that the only one world 
was created, such an achievement ought to be counted as the most marvellous one . 
On the other hand, Williams Lane Craig rejects premise (5) claiming that it is impos-
sible for non-existent beings to create anything existent (Craig’s talk is available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=sMFbKpPM-AM [accessed April 4th 2018] . My line of criticism of Gask-
ing’s parody is partly based on that widely accepted metaphysical principle, but it is not reduc-
ible to it . Craig’s critique, at least in its current state, does not succeed, since it does not address 
some Meinongian options worth considering that are available to the proponents of Gasking’s 
parody (see §2 for more details) . In due course, I try to enter more deeply into Gasking’s argu-
ment, and to anticipate some potential fallbacks available to those who are ready to defend it in 
order to show that even under the most plausible interpretation the argument does not work .
5 The example is used, for different purposes, by Joshua Knobe (2006: 224) . 
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If so, then not any disability is allowed in accounting for the marve-
lousness of an achievement, but just those disabilities that do not preclude 
something from being an achievement . In view of the last fact, it is possible 
to draw the distinction between the two notions of disability . Let us call 
“achievement-non-precluding disabilities” those disabilities that do not pre-
clude something from being an achievement, and “achievement-precluding 
disabilities” those disabilities that do . Now, premise (3) should be formulated 
in the following way:
3a) The greater the achievement-non-precluding disability (or an 
achievement-non-precluding handicap) of the creator, the more im-
pressive the achievement .
However, this would make premises (4)–(6) of Gasking’s parody contentious 
under the same reading of the notion of disability, for it is more likely that, 
in the case of achievements that are created in the actual world, that is, in the 
case of existent achievements, non-existence is an achievement-precluding 
disability rather than the achievement-non-precluding one . According to a 
widely accepted metaphysical principle, non-existent entities cannot be caus-
ally related to existent entities in any relevant sense .6 If so, then non-exist-
ence in premises (4)–(6) should be understood as an achievement-precluding 
handicap, which makes Gasking’s parody invalid, given that premises (2) and 
(3) seem plausible only if deployed in terms of achievement-non-precluding 
(dis)abilities .
2. Introducing Meinongianism: Is Non-Existence the 
Most Formidable Handicap?
As a response to the objection presented in the previous section, a defender of 
Gasking’s parody might appeal to fictional characters and argue that there is 
a sense in which it is possible to attribute properties to non-existent objects . 
This would invoke a Meinongian metaphysics, according to which there are 
non-existent objects (see Meinong 1960 for more details) .
As is well known, Meinongianism is defended in more than one way (see 
Berto 2008 for more details), and some philosophers believe that Anselm’s on-
tological argument is based on a Meinongian metaphysics (see, for example, 
6 William Lane Craig thinks that denying this principle would be logically incoherent 
(Craig’s talk is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMFbKpPM-AM [accessed April 
4th 2018]. 
Relatedly, even those who, inspired by Descartes (see, for example, Descartes 1991: 
358–359), argue that God can do the (metaphysically and logically) impossible, typically have 
in mind that an existent God, and not a non-existent one, can do impossible . 
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van Inwagen 2012: 146) . More importantly, Gasking himself presupposed a 
Meinongian metaphysics, since in his argument existence and non-existence 
are understood in terms of abilities and disabilities that an object can possess . 
Thus, interpreting Gasking’s parody in the light of a Meinongian metaphys-
ics seems quite natural .
For the sake of simplicity, let us recall one possible way of understand-
ing Meinongianism, which can be found in the work of edward Zalta, ac-
cording to which there are two modes of property possession: exemplification 
and encoding (Zalta 1983: 12) .7 For example, the fictional character Sherlock 
Holmes encodes the property being a detective, but fails to exemplify it . In-
stead, Sherlock exemplifies the property being a non-detective, being a fictional 
character, and the like . Zalta’s distinction enables us to make the process of 
creating the world by the fictional God intelligible: the fictional God encodes 
the property being the creator of the world and exemplifies the property being 
a fictional character . In that respect, one might argue that there is a sense in 
which non-existence need not be understood as an achievement-precluding 
disability .
In addition, the defender of Gasking’s parody might even argue that by 
“world” or “universe”, mentioned in premises (1) and (5), Gasking meant the 
fictional world (or the fictional universe), and not the actual one . Relatedly, 
the term “achievement” might be interpreted in the same way . Let us recall 
here that there is more than one theory of actuality, and that some philoso-
phers are interested to find out what justifies our common belief that our 
world is actual (see Adams 1974 for more details) . Bearing this in mind, it 
is interesting to address the possibility that our world is not actual, and the 
possibility that the fictional God encodes the property being the creator of the 
world in order to check if such a remedy would render Gasking’s argument 
more convincing . These options will be, among other things, addressed in 
due course .
However, if we focus only on the “achievements” of fictional characters, 
there is no reason to understand existence as the “most formidable handicap”, 
contrary to what is stated in premise (4) of Gasking’s parody, since all fictional 
characters are non-existent by definition . In the case of fictional characters, it 
looks more convincing if, by using Gasking’s own criteria, we evaluate the 
merits of their “achievements” with respect to other properties they encode . 
For example, we are amazed by Sherlock Holmes’s ingenuity manifested in 
solving crimes by noticing subtle details that were left unnoticed by other fic-
tional characters depicted in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s novels . When reading 
7 The following argumentation against Gasking’s parody will be based on Zalta’s version 
of Meinongianism, but, mutatis mutandis, it works also within other versions of Meinongian-
ism, such as Parsons’ (see Parsons 1980 for more details) .
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Doyle’s stories, it does not make sense to claim that, for example, we would 
be more amazed by Sherlock Holmes’s achievements once we realize that he is 
a fictional character, since we knew from the very beginning that neither he, 
nor the products of his achievements exist in the actual world . What makes 
the achievements that Sherlock encodes more impressive than the achieve-
ments encoded by other fictional characters portrayed by Doyle is the way 
of resolving three-pipe problems, or, to use Grey’s phrase, quoted at the very 
beginning of this paper, the ability of “achieving so much with so little” .
By the same token, we can modify Grey’s example and, instead of im-
agining existent quadriplegic exemplifying the property being the creator of 
an elaborate model of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, it is possible to imagine 
a fictional quadriplegic encoding the same property . Such an achievement, 
albeit fictional, would still be more marvellous than a fictional achievement 
encoded by a fictional person not suffering from quadriplegia . The moral of 
the modified Grey’s example is that suffering from quadriplegia (in the sense 
of encoding such a property by a fictional character) is the greater handicap 
within the domain of fictional characters than non-existence . examples like 
that can be multiplied in various ways . In a nutshell, within the domain of 
fictional characters, non-existence would not seem to be the most formidable 
handicap, contrary to what is stated in premise (4) of Gasking’s parody .
3. On “More Impressive” Achievements
A defender of Gasking’s parody might respond to the objections raised in §1 
and §2 by claiming that the main idea of the parody was to make the com-
parison between the achievement of existent God and the achievement of 
non-existent God rather than just to compare the achievements of fictional 
characters . Premises (5) and (6) of the parody seem to go in favour of this 
view, as well as the interpretation of Gasking’s parody that was mentioned in 
§2, according to which creating the world by God need not be understood 
as creating the actual world . This would lead to the comparison between 
the achievement that is exemplified by the existent God and the achieve-
ment that is encoded by the non-existent God, since fictional God cannot 
exemplify the property being the creator of the world . In view of the last fact, 
premise (5) should be interpreted in the following way:
5a) Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an ex-
istent creator, who exemplifies the property being the creator of the 
world, we can conceive a greater being – namely, one who created 
everything while not existing, that is, the one who encodes the prop-
erty being the creator of the world .
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However, this premise, taken at face value, is rather implausible . After all, in 
everyday life we usually praise more, ceteris paribus, the merits of achievements 
that are exemplified by existent creators than the merits of achievements that 
are encoded by fictional characters: The real quadriplegic exemplifying the 
property being the creator of an elaborate model of the Sydney Harbour Bridge is 
arguably the greater creator than the fictional one who encodes the very same 
property; real Novak Djokovic winning six Australian Open titles is greater 
tennis player than his fictional twin encoding the property being the winner 
of six Australian Open titles, and the like .8
In the latter case, winning Australian Open title six times (in the sense 
of encoding a property) seems like an easiest thing to do for fictional Novak 
Djokovic, while, on the other hand, existent Novak Djokovic should spend 
an incredible amount of effort in order to exemplify the same property . This 
is in accordance with common intuition that possibility outstrips actual-
ity . Relatedly, it is very easy to imagine Novak Djokovic winning Australian 
Open title, let us say, twenty times, but something like that is incredibly 
hard, if not impossible, to achieve in the real life . In cases in which exempli-
fied achievements are compared with encoded achievements, it is more likely 
that, contrary to what is claimed in premise (4) of Gasking’s parody, existence 
is a handicap rather than an ability! Thus, it turns out that, mutatis mutandis, 
even according to Gasking’s own principle that the greater handicap makes 
the achievement more impressive, the existing God who exemplifies the 
property being the creator of the world would be the greater creator than the 
non-existing God who encodes the same property, which would contradict 
premise (5a) .
Now, let us check briefly what would happen if we take seriously the 
idea, mentioned in §2, that our world is not actual, and that God’s achieve-
ment is an imaginary one . It seems that creating such a world by fictional 
God would still not be the more impressive achievement than imagining 
(and, in that sense, creating) the same world by existent God . For in that 
case, the comparison would be analogous to the one in which the merit of the 
achievement of existent Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (creating fictional character 
Sherlock Holmes) is compared to the merit of the same achievement accom-
plished by the fictional Sir Arthur Conan Doyle . However, in everyday life, 
we would not praise the latter accomplishment more than the former . Quite 
the contrary, we think that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is a great writer because 
of inventing the stories about Sherlock Holmes . His achievement would nor-
mally be praised more than the same achievement encoded by the fictional 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle . At any rate, the example with Sir Arthur Conan 
8 Of course, real wrongdoings are, ceteris paribus, typically more blamed than fictional 
wrongdoings .
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Doyle creating Sherlock Holmes, as well as the abovementioned examples 
with Novak Djokovic winning Australian Open title and the quadriplegic 
creating an elaborate model of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, suggests that, 
ceteris paribus, we are typically not more amazed by imaginary achievements 
than by the real ones, contrary to what premise (5a) presupposes . Premise (3) 
of Gasking’s parody should be rejected for similar reasons, since the above-
mentioned examples show that there are cases in which disabilities, such as 
non-existence, need not make an achievement more impressive .
Let us summarize . Insofar non-existent God cannot exemplify the prop-
erty being the creator of the world, premise (5) of Gasking’s parody turns out 
false, since it violates the basic metaphysical principle, according to which 
non-existent beings cannot be causally related to existent beings . Appealing 
to fictional characters and Meinongian metaphysics might look like an inter-
esting remedy of Gasking’s parody . Yet, under closer scrutiny, such a fallback 
will not save the day, either because non-existence need not be considered the 
most formidable handicap within the domain of fictional characters, contrary 
to what is claimed by premise (4), or because the achievement of the fictional 
God who encodes the property being the creator of the world is not more im-
pressive than the achievement of the existent God who exemplifies the very 
same property, contrary to what is stated by premise (5a) (and premise (3) as 
well) . In a nutshell, non-existence would be the most formidable handicap 
for existent creators that, alas, precludes something to be an achievement in 
the actual world, while for fictional characters it is neither the most formida-
ble handicap, nor it makes fictional achievements more impressive .9
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